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HE purpose of insurance underwriting is to use data about a risk
to evaluate that risk. Specifically, factual information is used to
determine whether the risk is appropriate for a company and to
determine the appropriate price of the insurance for that risk. This deter-
mination is, by its very nature "discrimination," but it is a valid and ap-
propriate means of underwriting. However, certain data is deemed
unfairly discriminatory, and its use is outlawed. "Redlining" is "charging
higher rates or declining to write insurance for people who live in particu-
lar areas (figuratively, sometimes literally enclosed with red lines on a
map).' 1
The emergence of the Internet has brought with it a new set of ques-
tions and concerns for the insurance industry regarding redlining. Some
commentators believe the opportunity to purchase insurance online will
usher in a new era of equality through increased access and elimination of
the need for face to face encounters. Others fear that selling policies on-
line presents insurance companies with new opportunities for discrimina-
tion, thus breathing new life into the specter of redlining.
"Weblining" is the use of the World Wide Web to practice any form of
redlining. As relevant to insurance providers, most discussions of insur-
ance weblining address either access to the Internet or profiling potential
customers. As an access issue, there is concern that underprivileged con-
sumers who lack access to the Internet are intentionally excluded from
the benefits of online rebates. "Electronic Redlining" addresses the re-
lated concern that telecommunications companies bypass disadvantaged
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neighborhoods when installing new technology that enables or enhances
Internet access. The second category of weblining is the use of personal
data about an individual to create a specialized customer profile and us-
ing that profile to limit a customer's access to insurance sales.
The scope of this article is to identify the types of potential allegations
of weblining posed by the Internet and to discuss precautions that insur-
ance companies can take to ensure equitable treatment and minimize the
risk of a weblining allegation. Because there are no reported cases of
insurance weblining, this paper explores weblining litigation in related
industries.
A. A BRIEF REDLINING PRIMER
The historic parent of weblining is redlining, a practice by which insur-
ers literally drew a red line on a city map around neighborhoods the in-
surers presumed presented unacceptably high insurance risks.2 Insurance
companies avoided selling insurance to all residents living within the pe-
rimeter of the red line; as a result, anyone residing within the area was, as
a practical matter, unable to purchase insurance. 3 Today the concept of
redlining has expanded. It includes practices such as cancellation, or re-
fusal to renew property insurance, based upon the location of the prop-
erty4 or the racial or ethnic makeup of the neighborhood.5 These
practices have been outlawed in all 50 states because they are based on
(or at least lead to) illegal discrimination rooted in race.6 Nevertheless,
2. See Simms v. First Gibraltar Bank, 83 F.3d 1546, 1551 n.12 (5th Cir. 1996) (term
"redlining" derives from evaluation of applications "based on a residential map where inte-
grated and minority neighborhoods are marked off in red and designated as risk areas).
3. See id.
4. Insurance Information Institute, Urban Insurance Issues, (Nov. 2000), at http://
www.iii.org/media/hottopics/insurance/urban.
5. See Sara K. Pratt, The History of Insurance Redlining (statement made at the John
Marshall School of Law's conference on mortgage discrimination and insurance redlining),
at http://www.fairhousing.com/resources/general-resources/insuranceredlining.htm (last
visited Aug. 8, 2001). See also Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d at 291 (plaintiffs may
prevail if they show that "insurer has drawn lines according to race rather than actuarial
calculations").
6. Section 4(G) of the Model Unfair Trade Practices Act defines unfair discrimina-
tion as an unfair trade practice "[m]aking or permitting any unfair discrimination between
individuals of the same class" and similarly situated for: rates charged in life insurance
policies (§ 4(G)(1)); premium, policy and rate for accident or health insurance policies
(§ 4(G)(2)); refusing to renew, issue, or canceling property coverage because of location
(4(G)(2)); and refusing to renew, issue, or canceling insurance on a residential property
risk (4(G)(4)). (National Association of Insurance Commissioners Unfair Trade Practices
Act, Jan. 1991.) The following states have adopted either the NAIC model legislation, or
similar legislation: Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Washington D.C., Georgia,
Guam, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachu-
setts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Texas, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia. The following states have
adopted related legislation: Alabama, Illinois, Oregon, Utah, Virgin Islands, and Wiscon-
sin. The following states have adopted a combination of the Model Regulations and related




reputable insurance companies allegedly still engage in illegal forms of
redlining, such as using zip codes to target sales in affluent, non-minority
neighborhoods, 7 paying out lower benefits based on the insured's race,8
or charging "race-based additive premiums" for insurance policies.9
Due to increased awareness and state and federal statutory remedies,
insurance redlining has taken on much more subtle characteristics today
than in its early days, making it much more difficult to identify. 10 In the
early 1900s, insurers openly and blatantly discriminated on the basis of
race, even writing policies of racial discrimination into manuals, which
contained the proverbial red lines in the maps distributed to agents." By
contrast, today redlining may only appear in the treatment of potential
customers, who may not even know that they are treated differently
based on their race or location.12 13 As discussed below, many commen-
tators feel that the Internet will be a tool for further subtlety in redlining
7. See, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Housing Opportunities Made Equal, Inc., 259
Va. 8, 13 (2000) (HOME sued Nationwide Insurance in Virginia for using zip-codes to
favor affluent non-minority neighborhoods. At the trial level, the Jury awarded $500,000
in compensation and $100 million in punitive damages. On appeal, the Virginia Supreme
Court overturned the verdict for lack of standing.). The Virginia Supreme Court agreed to
a rehearing on standing. Subsequently, on April 24, 1999, Nationwide announced a $17.5
Million dollar settlement, vacating the prior decision. See Inner City Press' Redline Re-
porter, at http://www.innercitypress.org/redliner.html (Dec. 4, 2000) (explaining settle-
ment). See also John L. Oberdorfer and Jeanne M. Liedtka, Insurance Redlining: An
analysis of Home, Inc. v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., at http//:www.pattonboggs.
com/news/views/1999/01/redline.html (last visited Aug. 9, 2001) (providing detailed account
and analysis of the case prior to standing decision).
8. Moore v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 267 F.3d 1209, 1212 (11th Cir. 2001).
9. See, e.g., Inner City Press' Redline Reporter, at http://www.innercitypress.org/red-
liner.html (Dec. 4, 2000 update) (Florida Insurance commissioner Bill Nelson alleged that
Houston-based insurer American General charged race-based additive premiums on in-
dustrial life insurance. Mr. Nelson stated, "[a]lthough many insurance companies stopped
selling such policies years ago, some insurers who were charging different rates based on
race did not reduce the higher premiums on existing policies when they eliminated such
pricing on new policies.").
10. William E. Murray, Homeowners Insurance Redlining: The Inadequacy of Federal
Remedies and the Future of the Property Insurance War, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 735, 737 (1997-
98).
11. Pratt, supra note 5.
12. If an institution excels at the practice of redlining, it will not receive any applica-
tions from persons in minority areas-thus making discrimination by the insurer more dif-
ficult to spot and stop. Charles L. Nier, III, Perpetration of Segregation: Toward a New
Histoical and Legal Interpretation of Redlinging Under the Fair Housing Act, 32 J. MAR-
SHALL L. REV. 617, 646 (1999). See alo Murray, supra note 10, at 738 (citing Hearing on
Homeowners Insurance Discrimination before the Senate Comm. On Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs, 103d Cong., Sess. 1 (statement of Deval Patrick, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral, Civil Rights Division)) (suggesting that the failure of insurance companies to keep
records of rejected applications and to record the race of applicants compounds the diffi-
culty of proving redlining).
13. This subtlety has perhaps inspired some commentators to suggest insurance redlin-
ing is a product of society's imagination, and perceived discriminatory trends are in fact a
reflection of the economic realities of urban life. For example, Benjamin Zycher, professor
of Economics at the University of California in Los Angeles, points to the laws of supply
and demand as the true cause of redlining. Benjamin Zycher, Consumers and Insurance
"Redlining": Consumers Take Charge Agenda for the 104th Congress, Issue Brief, at http://
www.consumeralert.org/issues/finance/Insure.htm (last visited Aug. 16, 2001).
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as the appearance of anonymity and the perceived facelessness of the In-
ternet allows businesses to cloak discriminatory practices.
Insurance redlining is damaging both because it severs the essential
link between insurance and the availability of housing, and because it has
serious mental and emotional repercussions on the excluded. Twenty-five
years ago, the National Panel on Insurance in Riot Affected Areas ex-
plained the sweeping need for insurance:
Insurance is essential to revitalize our cities. It is a cornerstone of
credit. Without insurance, banks and other financial institutions will
not and cannot make loans. New housing cannot be repaired. New
businesses cannot expand, or even survive. Without insurance,
buildings are left to deteriorate; services, goods and jobs diminish.
Efforts to rebuild our nation's inner cities cannot move forward.
Communities without insurance are communities without hope.' 4
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals concisely stated, "[n]o insurance,
no loan; no loan, no house ... ",5
Beyond the depressing economic effect redlining has on achieving fair
housing, its exclusionary nature promotes further social and economic
alienation among the disenfranchised.' 6 Insurance redlining has a ten-
dency to decrease employment prospects in excluded neighborhoods. 17 It
cuts off access to needed financial services, creating an economically de-
pressed neighborhood that ultimately mirrors the stereotypes on which
the decision to redline was literally founded. 18 Such stigmatization de-
creases one's ability to "secure basic rights of citizenship."' 9
Claims for insurance redlining are most often brought under the Fed-
eral Fair Housing Act, or state equivalents. 20 However, there is no defin-
itive legislation or judicial decision holding that the Fair Housing Act
applies to insurance. 21 In fact, throughout the 1980s there was a split
across circuit courts regarding the reach of the Fair Housing Act.22 Par-
tially in response to a regulation from HUD which specifically proscribed
14. Gregory D. Squires, Insurance Redlining: Still Fact, Not Fiction, National Health
Institute Online (Jan./Feb. 1995), at http://www.nhi.org/online/issues/79/isurred.html.
15. NAACP v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287,297 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
508 U.S. 907 (1993).
16. See Murray, supra note 10, at 740-42.
17. Christopher P. McCormack, Business Necessity in Title VIII: Importing an Employ-
ment Discrimination Doctrine into the Fair Housing Act, 54 Fordham L. Rev. 563, 599
(1986).
18. See Gregory D. Squires, Race Politics and the Law: Recurring Themes in the Insur-
ance Redlining Debate, in Insurance Redlining: Disinvestment, Reinvestment and the Evolv-
ing Role of Financial Institutions 1, 3 (Gregory D. Squires ed. 1997).
19. Id.
20. Specifically, claims are typically brought under § 3604(a) and § 3605. Section
3604(a) provides that it is unlawful to "otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling...
because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)
(1994). Section 3604(b) similarly prohibits discrimination in the provision of services in
connection therewith. Id. at § 3604(b). See also Murray, supra note 10, at 747.




insurance redlining under the Fair Housing Act, 23 the recent judicial
trend is towards allowing such claims.24
Redlining in violation of the Fair Housing Act can be disastrous for
insurance companies. The recent case, HOME, Inc. v. Nationwide Mu-
tual Insurance Co., was the first insurance redlining case to be decided by
a jury. 25 HOME accused Nationwide of discriminating against minorities
in marketing, advertising, agent location strategies, underwriting policies,
and rating territories in violation of Virginia's Fair Housing Act.26 The
jury awarded Home $500,000 in compensatory damages, and
$100,000,000 in punitive damages.27 The Virginia Supreme Court re-
versed the jury verdict, holding that because HOME's injury was "re-
mote," rather than "immediate," there was no standing to bring the
claim.28 Subsequently, the Virginia Supreme Court agreed to a re-hear-
ing, and the parties vacated the decision, settling for a reputed
$17,500,000.29 Undoubtedly, this will inspire future redlining litigation,
which could prove successful in states that are not as strict about
standing.30
B. WEBLINING AS AN ACCESS ISSUE
As an access issue, Weblining is simply the practice of offering an in-
sured a discount for purchasing a policy online. On the one hand, such
discounts make good business sense. It is more efficient to sell a policy
online, because it eliminates the need for regional sales offices and staff.31
In fact, it is within an insurer's right to charge premiums based on the cost
of distributing a policy. 32 The legal issue arises because there is concern
that these lower rates and better deals are motivated by an insurer's de-
sire to do business only with customers perceived as low risk. Regardless
23. In response to Mackey v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 724 F.2d 419, 423 (4th Cir. 1984),
HUD issued a statement that specifically prohibits insurance redlining under the Fair
Housing Act. See Murray, supra note 10, at 747; 24 C.F.R. § 100.70(b), (d)(4) (1996).
24. See NAACP v. Amer. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 508 U.S. 907 (1993); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cisneros, 52 F.3d 1351, 1358 (6th
Cir. 1995) cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1140; Strange v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 867 F. Supp.
1209, 1214 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
25. John L. Oberdorfer & Jeanne M. Liedkta, Insurance Redlining: An Analysis of
HOME, Inc. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., at http://www.pattonboggs.com/news/views/1999/
01/redline.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2001).




29. See Inner City Press' Redline Reporter, December 4, 2000 Update, at http://
www.innercitypress.org/redliner.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2001).
30. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Absent Express Agreement Insurer Not Permitted to Use
Arbitration Award Against Policyholder; CGL Policy May be Required to Cover Claims
Framed in Breach of Contrct Language Rather than Tort Language, 6 Conn. Ins. L.J. 539,
558-59 (1999-2000).
31. Joe Fry, Is the Internet Ripe for Discriminatory Insurance Weblining?, Insure.com:





of a company's motivation, there is concern that online rebates solidify
the separation between the insured and uninsured, because the poor who
would benefit the most from discounts are the most likely to be without
awareness or access to them.33 D.J. Powers, attorney for the Center for
Economic Justice, a consumer advocacy group in Austin, Texas, says
cheaper rates online are de facto "penalizing the poor for being poor. '34
Answers to the complex legal questions that may arise in this area will
depend partly on statistics, including data on both race and income, and
on changes in Internet demographics. Do Internet sales stem from inten-
tional discrimination? Even if an insurance company were to assume that
people of a particular race were better customers, does selling its service
on the web guarantee a particular clientele? Similarly, if an insurance
company wished to sell only to higher income brackets, do online dis-
counts accomplish this?
C. THE DIGITAL DIVIDE
"Digital Divide" is the term given to the disparity in the online ranks
between the rich and poor, as well as the apparent dearth of some minori-
ties online. 35 As stated by the Digital Divide Network:
There has always been a gap between those people and communities
who can make effective use of information technology and those
who cannot. [Ulnequal adoption of technology excludes many from
reaping the fruits of the economy.
We use the term "digital divide" to refer to this gap between those
who can effectively use new information and communication tools,
such as the Internet, and those who cannot. 36
The Digital Divide has been the subject of many studies and has gotten
much attention from policymakers over the last few years. 37
While it used to be a stark truism that a far greater number of whites
were online than other ethnicities, most recent reports show this is be-
coming less and less true. As stated by the Pew Internet Group, "[t]he
increase in online access by all kinds of Americans highlight the fact that
the Internet population looks more and more like the overall population
of the United States."' 38 According to Jeffrey Cole, director of UCLA's
center of Communication Policy, "[tihe Digital Divide seems to be cor-
recting itself. People who have been on the Internet four years or more
33. See id.
34. Id.
35. See generally, Todd Spangler, Study: Digital Divide is Disappearing, Interactive
Week, (Nov. 2, 2000), at http://www.zdnet.com/intweek/stories/news/0,4164,2649766,00.
html.
36. Digital Divide Network, Knowledge to Help Everyone Succeed in the Digital Age, at
http://www.digitaldividenetwork.org/content/sections/index.cfm?key=2 (last visited Aug.
15, 2001).
37. For an excellent collection of studies, and extensive documentation of policy re-
ports, please visit www.digitaldividenetwork.org, produced by the Benton Foundation.
38. Lee Rainie & Dan Packel, More Online, Doing More, The Pew Internet and
American Life Project, at http://www.pewinternet.org (Feb. 18, 2001).
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tend to be white, highly educated, and male. Among people who have
been on less than a year, it's more African-American, Latino and
female."'39
While whites still have higher percentages of their ranks online than
some minorities, all ethnic groups have made enormous gains in short
periods of time. As of December 2000, 57% of whites were on the In-
ternet, compared to 43% of blacks and 47% of Hispanics. 40 Each group
dramatically increased their presence from June of the same year, with
online whites increasing 20%, online blacks increasing at a faster 23%
and Hispanics at a slower 17%.41 A new report released in July 2001 by
the Pew Internet Foundation reports that Hispanics have nearly achieved
online representation proportional to that of the overall population and
equal in percentage to that of the white population. 42
However, raw access to the Internet does not necessarily tell who is
likely to buy an insurance policy online. When considering the potential
discriminatory effects of online discounts, it is important to observe what
different groups are actually doing while they are online. According to
the study from the Pew Internet group, 58% of blacks with Internet ac-
cess sought health information online, jumping 6% between June and De-
cember 2000.43 This is slightly higher than the 57% of the entire online
population accessing healthcare information, and higher than the 51% of
online Hispanics who have sought health information. 44 However, in
June 2000, only 36% of the African-American population had bought
something online, whereas 46% of the general population had done so. 45
By December 2000, the number of African-Americans purchasing some-
thing online rose to 48%, closing in on the 52% of the general population
that had done So.4 6 These numbers show that while the actual Digital
Divide may be closing, there is still potential disparity between what
whites and minorities are comfortable with and interested in doing on-
line. If activities of different demographics online do not become more
uniform, an insurer could still potentially predict the makeup of its online
customer base, despite statistics that point to uniformity in access.
Disparities in income and education reveal a much greater disparity in
access.47 However, even the poorest and least educated are rapidly com-
ing online.48 From June to December, 2000, those making under $30,000
39. Spangler, supra note 35.
40. Rainie & Packel, supra note 38, at 2.
41. Id. at 2-3.
42. Tom Spooner & Lee Rainie, Hispanics and the Internet, The Pew Internet and
American Life Project, 2, (Feb. 18, 2001), at http://www.pewinternet.org. As testament to
the frustrating nature of statistics, the most recent Pew study found white and Hispanic
penetration at 50%, whereas in More Online, Doing More, supra note 38, the percentage of
white internet usage was surveyed at 57%.
43. Rainie & Packel, supra note 38, at 7.
44. Id. at 7.
45. Id.
46. Id.




a year increased 36%, from 28% to 38% online; those making between
$30,000 and $50,000 increased from 50% to 64%. Those making between
$50,000 and $75,000 increased from 67% to 72%; and those making over
$75,000 are tapering off with an increase from 79% to 82%. 49 In Decem-
ber 2000, 39% of those with a high-school diploma or less were online,
compared to 71% of those with some college and 82% of those with a
college degree or higher.50 However, the less-educated are rapidly com-
ing online. Those with high school or less increased to 39% in the previ-
ous six-months, compared to those with some college and college or
higher, which increased to 71% and 82% respectively. 51
Even though there is general agreement that the digital divide is nar-
rowing, some studies suggest that lack of interest may slow the arrival of
online equality across all demographics. A study by the Pew Internet and
American Life Project, entitled "Who's Not Online," sought to discover
the intentions of off-line adults to get online.52 The study estimated that
roughly one-half of adults in the United States, about 94 million people,
were not online. 53 Of those not online, 32% will "definitely" not get on-
line, and 25% probably will never venture online. 54 On the other end of
the spectrum, only 12% of those not online say that they will "definitely"
go online, and 29% say that they will "probably" get Internet access.55
Those who state they will never get Internet access are defined most
strongly by their income and education. Some 82% of those having no
desire to get online have a high-school diploma or less, and 43% of this
group earns less that $30,000 a year. 56 Those not online list a variety of
reasons why they are not online, including the belief that it is dangerous,
they are not missing anything, it is confusing, and it is too expensive. 57
D. WILL THE DIVIDE EVER DISAPPEAR?
Some argue that the digital divide is misleading because of access to
computers at public schools and libraries. They believe there is a new
wave of cheap access that will soon trickle down. Jean-Bernard Duler,
CEO of Esurance, an online seller of car insurance in San Francisco, be-
lieves there is currently universal access for those who want it.58 Duler
acknowledges the Digital Divide, but contends that public libraries bridge




52. Amanda Lenhart et al., Who's Not Online: 57% of Those Without Internet Access
Say They Do Not Plan to Log On, The Pew Internet and American Life Project, (Release










that in the near future new web technology will be affordable to even the
lowest stratum of society.60 In particular, some look to WebTV61 as a
potential source of cheap access for all income levels.62
Libraries are not currently doing much to increase access. On the one
hand, the percentage of libraries that are connected in North America
has risen from 83% to 95%, potentially providing free access to at least
143 million people. 63 Despite the availability of library access, it has not
been a strong force in closing the digital divide. In August 2000, only
1.9% of the population had accessed the Internet through a public
libraiy 64
Cheap access is not a likely solution, at least in the short term. The
Pew Internet study explored the reasoning behind those who are not on-
line,65 and 39% felt access was too expensive.66 In addition, many people
simply have no desire to go online, regardless of cost. Of those that ex-
press no desire to go online, only 19% felt that they were missing out on
something.67 Of those who are merely reluctant to go online, 60% state
they don't feel like they are missing out on anything.68 Other studies
have made complementary findings. A UCLA Internet Report study
made complementary findings. The study showed 37.7% surveyed had
no terminal available, 33.3% had no interest, and only 9.1% did not ac-
cess the Internet because of the financial cost.69 One obvious conclusion
is that if those not online have no desire to be online, they will not access
the Internet from libraries or WebTV until they begin to see the Internet
as an important resource.70
60. David Blair, assistant Director of the Ohio insurance department, quoted in An
End to Redlining?, Internet Law Group Digital Newsletter, Ed. 10, Edited by Charles
Christian (June 1997), at http://www.jgrweb.com/jgrl.O/lib/newsletr/isgl-vlO.html.
61. WebTV is a television accessory that enables internet access without a computer.
For more information, visit <www.webtv.com>.
62. David Blair, assistant Director of the Ohio insurance department, quoted in An
End to Redlining? Internet Law Group Digital Newsletter, Ed. 10, Edited by Charles
Christian (June 1997), at <http://www.jgrweb.com/jgrl.O/lib/newsletr/isgl-vlO.html>.
63. John Carlo Bertot & Charles R. McClure, Public Libraries and the Internet 2000:
Summary Findings and Data Tables, National Commission on Libraries and Information
Science, 3, (Sept. 7, 2000), at http://www.nclis.gov/statsurv/2000plo.pdf.
64. Falling Through the Net: Toward Digital Inclusion, U.S. Dep't. of Commerce, at 47,
(Oct. 2000), at http://search.ntia.doc.gov/pdf/fttn00.pdf.
65. Leehart, supra note 52, at 2.
66. Id. at 11.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Jeffrey Cole, Surveying the Digital Future, UCLA Center for Communication Pol-
icy, 24, (Nov. 2000), at http://www.ccp.ucla.edu/ucla-internet.pdf.
70. Additionally, some impoverished groups do not even own the rudimentary phone
lines necessary to connect to the internet. According to the FCC, of the Latino households
with an income of less than $25,000 (66% of total Hispanic households) 20% lack phone
service. Additionally, in some predominantly black inner-city neighborhoods, 25% of
households have no phone service. These numbers are in sharp contrast to the overall
nationwide average of 94%. See Chad M. Kahl, Electronic Redlining: Racism on the Super-




Access to computers and the Internet is not the sole indicator of mem-
bership in the online community. Even as the digital divide lessens in
terms of raw access, the gap between those with access to broadband ser-
vices and those without remains large.71 Because the process of actually
laying out the wiring for these services is expensive and time consuming,
it can only be done in a piecemeal approach. Some broadband Internet
companies have been accused of "Electronic Redlining," skirting inner-
city or areas of high minority concentration when laying the foundation
for this technology.72 Some commentators feel that as computer owner-
ship and access to the Internet increases electronic redlining will continue
to alienate some demographics, making them less likely to feel a part of
the online community and making them less likely to use the resources of
the internet.73
Income and education are the demographics that most accurately char-
acterize access to broadband technology. A recent study by the GAO
found that in areas with no cable modem or DSL access, the poverty rate
was 14.5%, compared to 10.2% for areas with access to both; $35,633
median household income for those with, and $27,822 for those without.74
Broadband access is certainly not essential for purchasing insurance on
the Internet. However, by systematically excluding segments of the pop-
ulation from access to new technology a message is sent to the less privi-
leged that they are not part of this new age, potentially discouraging these
groups from using what resources they have. Delays in broadband access
have the potential of alienating entire generations of people. 75 Electronic
redlining of inner-city residences could produce "an entire generation of
lower-income Americans [that] will fall even further behind the general
populace." 76
An effect of this exclusion may be evident in statistics of daily usage.
Of those that have access to the Internet, minorities are less likely than
Caucasians to access the Internet daily. 77 In December 2000, 58% of
Caucasians with Internet access were online "yesterday," as opposed to
44% of African-Americans and 45% of Hispanics. 78 This is potentially
71. See id.
72. Ameritech's Video Dialtone, Pacific Telesis and Bell Atlantic have all been ac-
cused of electronic redlining. See id.
73. See id.
74. GAO report to the Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Telecommunica-
tions, Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives, Telecommunica-
tions: Characteristics and Choices of Internet Users, 22, (Feb. 2001) at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d01345.pdf.
75. See Kahl, supra note 70.
76. Id. See also Housatonic Cable Vision Co. v. Dep't of Public Utility Control, 622 F.
Supp. 798, 808 (D. Conn. 1985) (in support of holding that cable providers are required to
abide by state regulations court rely on Cable Act's prohibition against discrimination in
low income areas).




attributable to many factors, but does serve as an interesting guide for
how the different demographics integrate the Internet into their lives.
F. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF WEBLINING AS AN ACCESS ISSUE
Some insurance companies have already run into legislation aimed at
preventing inequalities stemming from selling discounted insurance poli-
cies over the Internet.79 For example, Reliance Direct, whose customers
are serviced by Kemper Auto & Home Insurance Co., offers a $50 dis-
count to customers in Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Nevada,
Ohio, Oregon or Pennsylvania who purchase policies online.80 However,
for their online customers in California, New York and Texas, there is no
discount, because it violates the rating laws of those states.81 California
Proposition 103 forbids such discounts because they cannot be "uniformly
promoted and offered to the public."'82 Similarly, New York forbids such
discounts because regulators are concerned that these discounts are not
available to those without access to the Internet. 83 Texas' statutory lan-
guage does not forbid Internet discounts per se, but only those discounts
that are approved by the state are permissible; such plans have not yet
been approved. 84
In order to avoid allegations of discrimination and to steer clear of
anti-rebating laws, some companies that sell insurance online abide by a
"one policy, one price" philosophy, and offer the same price regardless of
whether the policy is sold online or off.85 A blanket policy price helps
prevent even the vestiges of discrimination, leaving one company to
proudly announce that "Weblining is a non-issue for us."'86 Powers, of the
Center for Economic Justice, states that such policies are good for the
consumer in two ways. First, they inject competition into the marketplace
because offline policies will need to compete in price with online poli-
cies.87 Second, those without access are not punished.88 Joe Frey, writing
for insurance.com also notes the "tidy profit" that can be made by the
insurer when such savings are not passed down to the consumer.89
G. THE INTERNET AS A MEANS TO ALLEVIATE DISCRIMINATION
While it is true that selling insurance online currently excludes those
who are not Internet savvy, it is also important to consider the power of
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the Internet to potentially alleviate racial barriers. In a broad sense, Jerry
Kang sees a possibility that through the Internet, "we may move toward
'a society in which race is no longer an axis of social division, inequality,
and hatred, nor used to create a repressive social, economic, or political
status."' 90 Kang argues that purchasing goods and services on the In-
ternet is currently the only way to "skirt the aggravation of wondering,
'Am I being discriminated against?"'91
Eyler of Forrester Research, applies this model to purchasing insurance
online. 92 Eyler argues that the internet presents a great opportunity to
rid the discrimination that presently exists in agent based insurance sell-
ing. 93 Under the current system, he argues, because it is necessary to
meet face to face with an agent to purchase a policy, lower income types
often get poor treatment.94 By contrast, "no one is turned away from the
web.",95
Another problem the Internet potentially addresses is the absence of
insurance agents in inner-city neighborhoods. Currently, there is no law
that mandates insurance companies operate offices in minority or low-
income areas, and the absence of agent's offices can have chilling effects
on the availability of insurance. 96 For example, as "the racially integrated
neighborhood of Sherman Park on Milwaukee's west side changed from 1
percent non-white to 24 percent non-white between 1970 and 1980 ... the
number of insurance agents dropped from 22 to 9.1"97 Ohio Insurance
Commissioner Covington argues that the Internet could help solve this
problem, because it potentially gives inner-city communities that cur-
rently lack any insurance offices the opportunity to purchase policies.98
H. CUSTOMER PROFILING AS WEBLINING
Another form of weblining that may incur the displeasure of courts and
regulators is customer profiling. The historical antecedent in traditional
insurance redlining involved the identification of "high risk" customers
based on their place of residence. Frequently, factors like income level
and ethnicity affect an individual's options regarding where they live.
Therefore, the practice of selecting potential customers based on geo-
90. Jerry Kang, Cyber-Race, 113 HARV. L. REv. 1130, 1135 (Mar. 2000) (quoting
Gabriel J. Chin et a]., Beyond Self-Interest: Asian Pacific Americans Toward a Community
of Justice, A Policy Analysis of Affirmative Action, 4 UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM. L. J. 129, 160
(1996).
91. Id. at 1133.
92. See Fry, supra note 31.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Gregory D. Squires, Insurance Redlining: Still Fact, Not Fiction, National Health






graphic location resulted in unlawful discrimination.99 This is because, by
excluding specific neighborhoods, districts, and communities, insurance
companies eliminated entire sectors from their potential customer base.
With the emergence of the Internet, insurance companies will have new
opportunities for the old practice of excluding potential customers based
on their geographic location. Accompanying this is the concern that new
technologies give insurance companies access to detailed information on
potential customers. Insurance companies have the ability to limit an in-
dividual's access to insurance based on these highly personal profiles.
This section discusses weblining in the form of using the Internet to ex-
clude individuals based on the location of their residence, or on their per-
sonal information.
I. WEBLINING AS ZIP-CODE REDLINING
Insurance companies doing business online could easily exclude unde-
sirable customers by using information as seemingly innocuous as a zip
code. 1°° For example, a web user inquiring about a special Internet offer
might be required to input a certain amount of personal data in order to
receive further information. The webpage then categorizes zip codes as
"desirable" and "undesirable." The website then immediately links "de-
sirable" customers to a webpage where they can purchase a policy. "Un-
desirable" customers are channeled to an informational site that does not
give them the opportunity to apply for insurance. Similarly, a webpage
could offer basic insurance to all Internet users, while also offering a
"special" discount only to those within particular zip codes. Profiling can
be performed so seamlessly that the potential customer doesn't know that
he has been denied access or given an offer not available to others.10
New technology can make these tactics particularly surreptitious, be-
cause it is no longer necessary for an internet user to enter their zip code
on that particular site or even on that day. Through the use of "cookies,"
websites deposit information about the Internet user on his or her hard
drive. 102 Originally, these were readable only by the computer that
placed them there, but recent technology has enabled more and more
99. For example, when appraisers systematically decreased values in neighborhoods
occupied by blacks, the count found that the Fair Housing Act was implicated. See U.S. v.
Am. Inst. Of Real Estate Appraisers, 442 F. Supp. 1072, 1079 (N.D. IlI. 1977).
100. The Georgetown Internet Policy Privacy Survey reported that "92.8% of the sites
in the sample collected at least one type of personal identifying information (e.g. name, e-
mail address, postal address). 56.8% collected at least one type of demographic informa-
tion (e.g. gender, preferences, Zip-code)." Mary J. Culnan, Ph.D., Georgetown Internet
Privacy Policy Survey: Report to the Federal Trade Commission, 1, (June 1999), at http://
www.msb.georgetown.edu/faculty/culnanm/GIPPS/mmrpt.PDF.
101. See Robert Pitofsky, Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Consumer Protection,
Online Profiling: A Report to Congress, 6, available at http://www.producersconference.
com/pdf__files/online-profiling__one.pdf (June 2000).
102. A cookie is a small text file that is placed on a consumer's hard drive by a web




companies to read and share this information amongst themselves.10 3
With this method, it is possible for a website to gather geographic infor-
mation on an Internet user who is not aware it is available. For example,
an Internet user might enter a zip code on an unrelated site through a
purchase. The zip code could then be placed as a "cookie" on that user's
hard drive. If the user then goes to an insurance company's website, the
website can read this cookie, and know roughly where the user lives.
Based on its categorization of zip codes, the site can then initiate pop-up
windows that offer special deals and discounts to Internet users from ar-
eas the insurer thinks represent low risks. 10 4
The same information could be used to pitch sales without the potential
customer even entering an insurance website. Often Internet companies
have deals with each other, exchanging banner ads on their respective
sites. To exploit this, an insurance company could arrange an exchange
with a health-related informational website. Whenever an Internet user
whose cookies indicate an affluent neighborhood visits the site, a banner
for the insurance company advertising a discount would be posted. Or
the health information site could sell the user's email address to the insur-
ance company, who could then directly contact the potential customer.
This method of targeting sales could take weblining as an access issue
to new depths. In the previous section, we discussed the possibility that
companies are selling insurance over the Internet with the purpose of
targeting particular demographics allegedly represented by computer
ownership. But as computer usage begins to spread across all
demographics, Internet access weblining becomes less representative of a
demographic. However, based on zip codes insurance companies can tar-
get users within the Internet, rendering the apparent closing of the Digi-
tal Divide much less significant.
There has been no litigation or allegations of insurance companies ac-
tually using these tactics. However, in related industries, watchdog
groups have filed two cases alleging zip code redlining.
J. KozMo.coM
Kozmo.com (Kozmo) was an Internet based service that offered one-
hour delivery of movies, snacks, and CDs to parts of New York City,
Boston, Atlanta, Washington D.C., San Francisco, Seattle, and Chi-
cago. 10 5 In a case described as the first against cyber-redlining, 0 6 the
Equal Rights Center (ERC) in Washington D.C., along with two re-
sidents, filed a class action suit against Kozmo for excluding service from
103. See Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for
Information Privacy 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1411-12 (2001).
104. See Pitofsky, supra note 101, at 5.
105. See Silicon Alley Daily, Kozmo.com Accused of Racially Discriminatory Delivery
Practices, (Apr. 14, 2000), at http://www.siliconalleydaily.com/issues/sarO4142000.html.
106. MSNBC.com, Elliot Zaret and Brock N. Meeks, Kozmo's Digital Dividing Lines,
(Apr. 11, 2000), at http://www.msnbc.com/news/373212.asp.
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certain communities based on race.10 7 Ultimately, the ERC dropped the
claims.108 Kozmo agreed to contribute $125,000 to a joint program with
the ERC to increase minority access to the Internet, and announced plans
to include more predominantly minority communities in many of the cit-
ies in which they operated. 10 9 Kozmo has since gone out of business.
Even though the Kozmo case never went to trial, it is an instructive
case study in the types of legal claims that can be brought against a com-
pany that provides a service over the Internet and the difficulty of prov-
ing such claims. Commentators have noted that the specifics of the
Kozmo case are of particular interest to insurance companies. 110 While
laws cannot compel a retail store to build a location in a geographic area,
this does not apply to "virtual" businesses like Kozmo, or insurance com-
panies, because neither depend on a physical store to do business with a
customer.111
The ERC presented striking factual allegations about Kozmo's service
in Washington D.C. While the city is 66% black, the ERC alleged that
Kozmo served neighborhoods that are 65% white and only 25% black.112
Further, while nearly 350,000 of the city's 400,000 black residents live
outside areas served by Kozmo, 130,000 of Washington's 170,000 white
residents live within their service areas. 113 Kozmo's service areas seemed
to "creep right up to majority black neighborhoods and stop."'114
The ERC alleged that this pattern of discrimination violated two stat-
utes. First, the lawsuit alleged that Kozmo violated a Civil War era fed-
eral law that prohibits denying contracts based on race.115 Second, the
complaint alleged that Kozmo's practices violated the public accommoda-
tion statute of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which forbids denying services
based on race.' 1 6
Intent to discriminate, however, must be shown, and Kozmo's defense
was that they were merely serving areas with high Internet penetra-
107. See Equal Rights Ctr. v. Kozmo, Complaint, Civil Action, Apr. 13, 2000.
108. See Stephanie Ernst, Civil Rights Group Backs Down on Race-Bias Charges
Against Kozmo, Diversitylnc.com (Dec. 5, 2000) at http://www.diversityinc.com/insiderarti-
clepg.cfm?submenulD=330&ArticlelD=2149. Prior to ERC's decision not to refile in state
court, the Federal District Court had dismissed the suit, causing both sides to claim victory.
The ERC stated that they voluntarily withdrew with an intent to refile in state court, which
would afford more discovery time. Kozmo claimed that the case was dismissed due to a
lack of evidence. Elliot Zaret, Kozmo's Race-Bias Suit to be Refiled, MSNBC.com (Sept. 5,
2000), at http://www.msnbc.com/news/455788.asp.
109. See Greg Sandoval, Kozmo discrimination claims rescinded by group, Cnet.com
(Dec. 5, 2000), at http://news.cnet.com/news/o-1007-200-4005571.html.
110. See Elliot Zaret, Kozmo.com hit with lawsuit in wake of MSNBC.com probe,
MSNBC.com (Apr. 13, 2000), at http://msnbc.com/news/394407.asp.
111. Id.
112. Equal Rights Ctr. v. Kozmo, Complaint, Civil Action, April 13, 2000.
113. Id.
114. Elliot Zaret and Brock N. Meeks, Kozmo's Digital Dividing Lines, MSNBC.com
(Apr. 11, 2000), at http://www.msnbc.com/news/373212.asp.




tion.117 Kozmo stated that they were a new Internet company and had to
make prudent decisions with their investments to allow for potential
growth.1 18 However, ERC's attorney stated that the patterns of Kozmo's
service areas clearly resembled the patterns used by banks and insurance
companies before the laws changed. 1 9 "The banks used to do that," he
stated, "and it's called redlining.' 20 Further, David Berenbaum points
out that there are similar service decisions in each of the cities Kozmo
serves, demonstrating a national pattern of discrimination. 12' In Decem-
ber, 2000, however, after ERC decided not to pursue the claim, Beren-
baum stated that further research showed race was not a factor when
service areas were selected. 122
K. WELLS FARGO
In June 2000, the Association of Community Organizations for Reform
Now (ACORN), along with Ruth Isaac, filed suit against Wells Fargo 123
for using zip codes to segregate potential homebuyers.12 4 Among other
allegations, ACORN demonstrated that a portion of Wells Fargo's web-
site called the "Community Calculator"'125 collected zip code information,
and then "steered" home buyers to neighborhoods where that person's
race predominated. 1261 27 For example, if a person was moving from a
heavily minority populated area in Chicago to Dallas, the Community
Calculator would only suggest similarly populated areas in Dallas.
ACORN alleged that such promotion of racial segregation violated the
Fair Housing Act and claimed injuries based on a reduction in the de-
117. Dominos Pizza used a "safety first" argument to explain their refusal to deliver to
primarily black housing projects. However, Kozmo stated that when choosing delivery





122. See Greg Sandoval, Kozmo Discrimination Claims Rescinded By Group, Cnet.com
(Dec. 5, 2000), at http://news.cnet.com/news/o-1007-200-4005571.html.
123. On April 17, 2000, Northwest Mortgage merged with Wells Fargo and Company,
and now does business on Wells Fargo Home Mortgage. Isaac v. Norwest Mortg., No. 3:00-
CV-0989-L, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4146, at *3 n.2 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 30, 2001).
124. Id. at *34.
125. Wells Fargo has stated that this community search service is actually a link pro-
vided to an independently owned and operated site, www.Homefair.com, which is licensed
to over 2,000 other web properties. See Ronna Abramson, Wells Fargo Accused of Online
Redlining, The Industry Standard (June 22, 2000), at http://www.thestandard.com/article/
0,1902,16296,00.html.
126. The other two complaints were that Wells Fargo had discouraged potential
homebuyers from neighborhoods by using overt racial classifications in their descriptions,
and that they were making loans on residential real estate on the basis of race or color of
the residents in the areas in question. See Isaac, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4146, at *2-3.
127. The actual court ruling does not mention zip codes. However several articles have
quoted from the actual complaint, stating that the site steers "residents of predominantly
minority ZIP codes to other predominantly minority Zipcodes." See e.g., Michael Liedtke,
Cyber-redlining: Wells Fargo Accused of Promoting Housing Segregation, THE Associ-




mand for homes in their neighborhoods thus lowering the value of their
real estate.128
While Wells Fargo immediately responded to other portions of the alle-
gation, 129 they did not remove the link to the Community Calculator, and
it is active as of this writing. 130 Most recently, in April 2001, a District
Court in Texas denied Wells Fargo's motion to dismiss for lack of stand-
ing. 131 At the time of this writing, this suit is still pending.
The claims against Wells Fargo and Kozmo illustrate the potential for
damaging allegations of weblining based on treatment of the geographic
information of potential customers. Before an online quote is given, in-
surance websites already request a zip code upon entry to the home page,
an understandable request since geographic location inevitably has a
bearing on premiums. 132 It is not difficult to imagine an insurer or insur-
ance producer using this information for similar redlining purposes.
L. HIGH-TECH CUSTOMER PROFILING
If geographic information presents an opportunity for insurers to web-
line within internet users, new industries which specialize in profiling cus-
tomers using techniques such as data-mining and Neural Networks will
allow insurers to hone their specialization even further.
The practice of profiling individual customers to target sales long pre-
dates the Internet.' 33 For years telesurveyers have asked questions about
an individual's likes and dislikes, questionnaires about interests have ac-
companied warranty cards and magazine sales, and spending patterns
have been analyzed by credit card companies. Just recently, Pizza Hut
came under attack because one of its employees refused to sell to a wo-
man who would not answer informational questions.134 For years, this
information has been routinely gathered and sold or traded to other com-
panies, who then streamline the data to target sales. 135
128. See Isaac, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4146, at *34.
129. The complaint alleged that the Community Calculator also characterized neigh-
borhoods using racial stereotypes. Wells Fargo immediately removed these references
from their site. See Ronna Abramson, Wells Fargo Accused of 'Redlining' on the Net, Com-
puterworld.com (June 23, 2000) at http://www.security-informer.com/englishl/crdwells_
306905.html.
130. Community Calculator Doesn't Compute, Executive Times, Vol. 2, Issue 7 (July,
2000), available at http://www.hopkinsandcompany.com/archive%5Carchive0700.htm.
131. Isaac, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4146, at *34.
132. See, e.g., www.esurance.com; www.allstate.com; www.prudential.com.
133. See Douglas J. Wood, Protecting Online Privacy: Government Regulation or Free
Market Initiative, Washington Legal Foundation, Critical Legal Issues, Working Paper Se-
ries No. 101, available at http://adlaw.com/pdf/wood.pdf (Jan. 2001).
134. A spokesperson for Pizza Hut stated that the employee had overstepped the
grounds of the company's data-collection policy. See Marcia Stephanek, Washington State
Plants a Stake for Online Privacy, BusinessWeek Online (Feb. 18, 2000), at http://
www.businessweek.com:/bwdaily/dnflash/feb2000/nfOO218c.htm.
135. This is practiced by such vendors as Hart, Hanks, and Acxiom, who collect and
combine various information from sweepstakes entries and questionnaires and resell it to




Online profiling is basically the same practice. However, the World
Wide Web has initiated a paradigm shift regarding the ease and detail of
collecting, augmenting, and analyzing the necessary data. 136 New tech-
nology in "data mining" has made it easier for Internet based companies
to accumulate data from public records and sales histories, to combine it
with information on an individual's Internet usage, and to create a highly
detailed profile of an individual.' 37
Companies can subscribe to "neural networks," which enable them to
instantly access profiles of existing and potential customers. 138 With
these profiles, companies can form sales tactics and procedures based
solely on these statistics. This technology has sped up the databases to
the extent that a customer service or sales representative can retrieve de-
tailed information on a customer as they wait on the phone or as they
work for an online application to process. 39
Potential uses for profiling have been illustrated by the banking indus-
try. Currently, many banks are known for assigning ranks of customers
based on internally collected data of their assets and past behavior. 140
For example, Sanwa Bank rates their customers as "A," "B," or "C"
based upon how much money each customer makes for the bank. 14' 142
Those customers labeled as "A" have fees and bounced checks waived
without question, whereas those labeled as "C" get the least perks. 143
Similarly, First Union Bank uses a computer system called Einstein to
produce information on a customer within 15 seconds. The bank then
uses a color coded system that aids customer service representatives in
servicing customers, and directs them to offer more flexible credit card
rates to higher valued customers. 144
Acxiom Corporation is a leading company in the stockpiling of detailed
information such as names, addresses, income, race, religious affiliation
and similar data. They are reputed to have profiles of over ninety-five
million American households. 45 Database America boasts detailed in-
formation on 165 million people in 70 distinct categories. 46 A year ago,
136. See generally, Leigh Jackman, Weblining: Data Mining for Customer Profitability,
at http:www.msb.georgetown.edu/faculty/culnanm/EC/Briefings3/jackmanl.htm (Apr. 9,
2000). It should be noted that the collection and selling of personal data on the Internet
has raised a number of privacy issues, but these are outside the scope of this article.
137. See generally, Constance Parten, Data Mining vs. Privacy, at http://www.insurancejrnl.com/html/ijweb/publications/IJWest/w6l2O0/datam-priv.htm (last visited June 5, 2001).
138. See generally, id.
139. See generally, id.
140. See Marcia Stephanek, Weblining, BusinessWeek Online (Apr. 3, 2000), at http://
www.businessweek.com/2000/00_14/b3675027.htm.
141. Id.
142. Interestingly, in "A History of Redlining" John Little describes insurance compa-
nies labeling prospective neighborhoods "A," "B," "C," and "D" in descending order of
desirability. John Little, A History of Redlining, at http://www.mdcbowen.org/p2/rm/red-
line.html (last visited Aug. 15, 2001).
143. See supra note 142.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See Solve, supra note 103, at 1410.
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it was estimated that 23% of companies were using similar services to
"micro-segment" their customers, and that number is expected to swell to
over 60% within a short time.147 In 1999, Axciom offered a new service
called InfoBase Ethnicity System, which was described in their marketing
catalogue as a "broad and precise breakdown of ethnic, religious, and
minority classifications."' 48 Companies such as Acxiom and Database
America then merge it with existing information collected by internet
sites, and move it online for quick access. 149
Acxiom and its contemporaries feel that use of this data merely allows
businesses to specialize their pitch through understanding and anticipa-
tion of their client's needs. 150 They also note that the data collected is
public data, mostly based upon census information. 15'
Insurers can also use "neural networks" to assemble available data
about an individual.' 52 Such a profile allows an insurer to make a snap
decision about who qualifies as a low-risk or high-risk potential cus-
tomer. Inquiring consumers who fit an insurance company's profile of a
desirable risk will receive service. Consumers who do not can be linked
to an informational site and effectively denied service. Sophisticated sites
can offer special discounts to those customers they determine to be the
most desirable.' 53
Of course insurers' access to this information does not necessarily
mean it will be used to exclude customers. Much like use of information
that has always existed, legal issues arise when this information is used to
unfairly discriminate against potential clients.
II. CONCLUSION
Technology continues to develop new tools for the sale and marketing
of insurance on the Internet. As these tools mature and proliferate, so
147. Stepanek, supra note 142. Other examples of companies that use customer profil-
ing tactics similar to weblining include CHARLES SCHWAB who tracks online purchasing
and service usage to match the customers with specific promotions; WEYERHAUSER COR-
PORATION uses weblining to determine its most profitable customers and to rank suppliers
based on performance and cost; CATALINA SUPERMARKETS segments potential customers
based on what products they buy and what they pay, in order to offer high-value customers
special offers and free delivery; 20,m CENTURY Fox sorts through box office receipt data
to identify which films actors and story lines are most popular by region, neighborhood and
specific theater; and VISA INTERNATIONAL segments customers based on patterns of fraud
to flag customers that may be at risk for credit problems. See Leigh Jackson, Weblining:
Data Mining for Customer Profitability, at http:www.msb.georgetown.edu/faculty/culnanm/
EC/Briefings3/jackmanl.htm (Apr. 9, 2000).
148. Stepanek, supra note 142.
149. See Solve, supra note 103.
150. See Parten, supra note 139.
151. See id.
152. See Leigh Jackson, Weblining: Data Mining for Customer Profitability, at
http:www.msb.georgetown.edu/faculty/culnanm/EC/Briefings3/ackmanl.htm (Apr. 9,
2000).
153. See generally, Robert Pitofsky, Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Consumer
Protection, Online Profiling: A Report to Congress 6, available at http://www.producers
conference.com/pdf-files/online-profiling-one.pdf (June 2000).
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will potential opportunities for unfair discrimination to occur in
cyberspace.
